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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Morgan timely appeals from the district court's orders revoking probation
and denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motions requesting
leniency. On appeal, Mr. Morgan argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various
transcripts he requested be added to the record on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Morgan
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to further reduce his
sentence in docket number 40775 and when it failed to reduce his sentence in docket
number 40776 sua sponte upon revoking probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 40775 (hereinafter "First Case"), Mr. Morgan was charged, by
information, with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.18-19.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Morgan pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of a
controlled substance and an amended count of possession of a controlled substance
and, in return, the State dismissed the remaining count. (R., pp.23-24.) Thereafter, the
district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two and one-half years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.50-52.) Upon review of Mr. Morgan's period of
retained jurisdiction (hereinafter "rider"), the district court suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Morgan on probation. (R., pp.56-58.)
In docket number 40776 (hereinafter "Second Case"), Mr. Morgan was charged,
by information, with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.175-176.) In the First
Case, the State also filed a report of probation violation alleging that Mr. Morgan

1

violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.62-63.)

At a consolidated hearing, 1

Mr. Morgan admitted to violating the terms of his probation in the first case.2
pp.68.)

(R.,

In the Second Case, Mr. Morgan pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled

substance. (R., pp.67-68, 177-178.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a concurrent
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed in the Second Case. (R., pp.7376, 187-190.) The district court continued Mr. Morgan's probation in the First Case and
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation in the Second Case. (R., pp.7376, 187-190, 196-199.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation
in both cases alleging that Mr. Morgan violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.7879, 203-204.) In both cases, Mr. Morgan pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his
probation for failing to complete a treatment program. (R., pp.78-79, 88-89, 203-204,
217-218.) The district court revoked probation and retained jurisdiction in both cases.
(R., pp.92-95, 221-223.)

Upon review of Mr. Morgan's rider, the district court

suspended the sentences placed Mr. Morgan on probation in both cases. (R., pp.97-99,
227-229.)
After a third period of probation, Mr. Morgan admitted that he violated the terms
of his probation in both cases by consuming methamphetamine.

(10/15/12 Tr., p.2,

L.21 - p.3, L.7.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Mr. Morgan

1

Although not formally consolidated, all of the subsequent proceedings were treated as
if they were formally consolidated.
2 The minutes from the January 4, 2010, probation violation admission hearing do not
specify the specific terms of probation to which Mr. Morgan admitted to violating. (R.,
pp.67-68.) In anticipation of such a problem, Mr. Morgan moved the Idaho Supreme
Court for a transcript of said hearing. (Motion to Augment and Suspend to Briefing
Schedule, pp.1-4.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Morgan's request for
the transcript. (Order (hereinafter "Order Denying Motion to Augment"), pp.1-2.)
2

violated the terms of his probation in both cases for failing to inform his probation officer
about a change in his employment, absconding, and failing to complete treatment
program. (10/29/12 Tr., p.21, L.3 - p.22, L.7.) The district court revoked probation in
both cases and executed the underlying sentences.

(R., pp.122-124, 255-257.)

Mr. Morgan timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp.133-134, 268-269.)
Approximately ten days after the orders revoking probation were file stamped,
Mr. Morgan filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in both cases. (R., pp.126-127,
259-260.)

In the First Case, the district court reduced Mr. Morgan's to a unified

sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but did not reduce his sentence in the
Second Case. (R., pp.130, 264.) The district court never entered a dispositive order on
Mr. Morgan's Rule 35 motions.
On appeal, Mr. Morgan filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-5.) The State objected in part to Mr. Morgan's
request for the transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the

Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion
to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting
Mr. Morgan's request for the dispositional hearing held on January 28, 2013, but denied
Mr. Morgan's

request

for

the

change

of

plea/sentencing

hearing

held

on

March 31, 2008, the dispositional hearing held on December 15, 2008, the sentencing
hearing held on March 2, 2009, the admit/deny and change of plea hearing held on
January 4, 2010, the dispositional and sentencing hearing held on February 1, 2010, the
admit deny hearing held on July 13, 2010, and the dispositional hearing held on
August 2, 2010. (Order, (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

3

ISSUES

1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Morgan due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for review of the
issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed, in the First Case to further
reduce, and failed in the Second Case to reduce, Mr. Morgan's sentences sua
sponte upon revoking probation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Morgan Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The
Issues On Appeal

A

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Morgan's request for transcripts
of the change of plea/sentencing hearing held on March 31, 2008, the dispositional
hearing held on December 15, 2008, the sentencing hearing held on March 2, 2009, the
admit/deny and change of plea hearing held on January 4, 2010, the dispositional and
sentencing hearing held on February 1, 2010, the admit deny hearing held on July 13,
2010, and the dispositional hearing held on August 2, 2010. On appeal, Mr. Morgan is
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts of the
dispositional hearing held on February 28, 2011, and the rider review hearing held on
October 17, 2011. Mr. Morgan asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the
issues of whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation and whether the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to further reduce on sentence and failed to reduce the other
5

sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation

because the applicable standard of

review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of
the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Morgan With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art.

I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a).
6

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to
be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(9).

See

State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR.
11 (c)(6)).

The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous.
7

The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
8

Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due

process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
9

appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Morgan's Appeal Because He Is
Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we
10

review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).

In other

words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district
court's sentencing decisions.

This scope of review is necessary in Idaho because

judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield,
106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984).
In this case, Judge Tingey presided over the final disposition hearing held on
January 28, 2013. (R., pp.120-121.) Judge Tingey also presided over all of the prior
proceedings in this matter. (R., pp.23-34, 45-47, 67-68, 73-76, 88-89, 90-91, 109-110,
113-114, 71, 76.) As such, the Adams Opinion indicates that an appellate court will
presume Judge Tingey relied on his memory of those proceedings when it executed
Mr. Morgan's sentences after revoking probation. Additionally, Judge Tingey expressly
stated that he reviewed Mr. Morgan's file on multiple occasions when determining what
he thought would be an "appropriate disposition." (01/28/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24.) Since
Judge Tingey's review would have refreshed his memory of the hearings at issue,
transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to review the
merits of his appellate sentencing claims.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
11

placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed the order
revoking probation, and here Mr. Morgan is challenging the length of his sentence,
12

which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation." 3 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the
requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation
revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts are
relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district
court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which
the appeal was filed. Rather, the court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from lts
own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.A.R. 30 follow:
3

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Morgan recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals has
recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 Published
Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Mr. Morgan disagrees with the holding
in that case.
13

(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed
in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance

upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking
probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court
of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
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hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts." Id The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.
presumed

the Judge

would

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

automatically consider

prejudgment events when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not, is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings
when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme court's decision to deny Mr. Morgan access to those transcripts
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be
dismissed without the transcript.

Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81.

Similarly, in Idaho, an

appellant must provide an adequate record of face procedural default.

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
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which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, . . . . and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872,

873 (Ct App. 1985).

If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court

minutes that may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is
possible, then the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of
Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court
minutes to provide ... [a] record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho
489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Morgan fails to provide the appellate court with

transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Morgan's sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state
action, combined with Mr. Morgan's indigency, which prevents him from access to the
necessary transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, in light of the denial of the transcripts the foregoing presumption
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. Morgan
was given the opportunity of multiple periods of probation, the district court must have
found that the circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of
society.

To ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings

presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Morgan. Denial of access to the requested
transcripts has prevented Mr. Morgan from addressing those positive factors in support
of his appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Morgan argues that the
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events which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the
district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are

necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 4 ; to the
contrary, the main question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the decision to deny Mr. Morgan's request for
the transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the
missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a
procedural bar to the review of Mr. Morgan's appellate sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Morgan's request for the transcripts was
denied, that presumption should be reversed in his favor.

4

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see a/so
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
17

D.

The Idaho Supreme Court. By Failing To Provide Mr. Morgan With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument.
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Therefore, Mr. Morgan has not

obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
Standards 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Morgan on
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Morgan is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Morgan his constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
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necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of
that review.
11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed, In The First Case To Further
Reduce, And Failed In The Second Case To Reduce, Mr. Morgan's Sentence Sua
Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Morgan asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, and his sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, are
excessive. Due to the district court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the
original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant
can challenge the length of the sentence as being excessive.

State v. Jensen, 138

Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Morgan does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Morgan must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
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individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that
Mr. Morgan's sentence is excessively harsh.
history is a mitigating factor.

Specifically, Mr. Morgan's employment

Mr. Morgan completed high school and received a "full

ride" baseball scholarship to Washington State University.

(PSI, p.5.)

Mr. Morgan

dropped out of college because he was a second round draft pick for the Phoenix
Cardinals. (PSI, p.5; Psychological Evaluation Report, p.1.) However, his career as a
professional baseball player was cut short when he broke his knee during a spring
training camp. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Morgan then began a new career as a professional truck
driver and a heavy equipment operator. (PSI, pp.5-6; Psychological Evaluation Report,
p.1.)
At the time Mr. Morgan's most recent probation violations where alleged he was

working full-time constructing windmills.

(10/29/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-10; p.21, Ls.3-6.)

Mr. Morgan was terminated from his first employer during his most recent period of
probation, but that was due to an incompatibility with his work schedule and his
treatment schedule. (10/29/12Tr., p.16, L.16-17, L.3.) Thedayafterhewasterminated
from his first job he was hired by the Swanson Company to construct windmills in the
greater Idaho Falls area. (10/29/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.4-6.) Mr. Morgan was responsible for
digging the holes for the windmill bases and had to live in a camper near the
construction site because he was on call twenty four hours a day. (10/29/12 Tr., p.17,
Ls.4-9.)

According to trial counsel, Mr. Morgan was in a catch-22 situation where he

had to choose between paying his bills or attending treatment. (01/28/13 Tr., p.3, Ls.713.)
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Despite some of the mistakes, Mr. Morgan made on probation his trial counsel
stated that, unlike other clients, Mr. Morgan was working hard on keeping a good job
and trying to temper the demands of that job with his probation programming. (01/28/13
Tr., p.4, Ls.2-8.) Trial counsel went on to state that Mr. Morgan is "somebody who
wants to get out there and work, wants to get his life together, wants to be a good
father, wants to be a good son, [and] wants to be a productive member of society.
(01/28/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-11.)
Additionally, Mr. Morgan's rider performance is a mitigating factor. While on his
first rider, Mr. Morgan received a few informal disciplinary sanctions, but took full
responsibility for them and did not attempt to justify or minimize his behavior. (2009
APSI, p.2.)

While on his second rider, Mr. Morgan only received one informal

disciplinary sanction for spending too much money at the commissary.
Mr. Morgan attended his classes and was prepared.

p.3.)

(2010 APSI,

(2009 APSI, pp.2-3.)

Mr. Morgan had a good attitude and put forth "a lot of effort in his class work." (2009
APSI, p.3.) Mr. Morgan received two probation recommendations from the Department
of Correction after completing his riders. (2009 APSI, p.5; 2010 APSI, p.6.)
While on his most recent period of probation, Mr. Morgan did sign up for
treatment and went through a three to four hour assessment. (10/29/12 Tr., p.17, L.24 p.25, L.4.) By the time that his treatment providers contacted him he was in county jail.
(10/29/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.4-8.)
Finally, Mr. Morgan's newly discovered mental health issues are mitigating
factors.

While on his last period of probation, Mr. Morgan participated in a mental

health evaluation, and Dr. Harper indicated that he suffers from a depressive disorder
and an anxiety disorder. (Psychological Evaluation Report, pp.1-3.) It is important to
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note, that as part of the original presentence investigation, Mr. Morgan participated in a
mental health evaluation performed by a licensed social worker that concluded
Mr. Morgan did not "meet the criteria for any mental health disorder .... " (Mental
Health Report attached to the 2009 PSI, p.1.)

This is important because his prior

treatment was primarily geared toward his substance addiction 5 and not mental health
issues. According to trial counsel, Mr. Morgan's issues in probation where related to his
mental health issues.

(01/28/13 TR., p.3, Ls.17-20.)

In fact, Dr. Harper thought

Mr. Morgan would benefit from a community-based treatment program which would help
him address his mental health issues. 6 (01/28/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-13.)
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that
Mr. Morgan's sentence is excessively harsh.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Morgan respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments
which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Morgan
requests that the fixed portions of his sentences be reduced.

DATED this 16th day of September, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

5

Mr. Morgan's addiction to methamphetamine began after the death of both his brother
and sister. (PSI, p.10.)
6 However, Mr. Morgan was not deemed an appropriate candidate for one of those
programs. (10/29/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-13.)
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